1 Other papers using the Harris-Todaro migration mechanism include: Corden and Findlay (I975), Fields (I975), Gersovitz (I974), Neary (I98I), and Stiglitz (I974, I982). In the Stiglitz (I974) model of labour turnover and migration there is some indication that optimal unemployment may not be zero and that a first-best solution cannot be attained without restrictions on migration. However, the maximising behaviour ofjob search from the employee's viewpoint is not sufficiently specified to prove this conclusion.
Discrimination of the type embodied in the first-best optimum can be achieved in a competitive equilibrium with an appropriate subsidy scheme if migration is controlled either physically or through a tax on the act of migration. If, however, rural and urban residents must have the same utility, the government cannot improve on the unrestricted competitive equilibrium. We discuss this equalutilities equilibrium in Section III.
Our central focus is, however, a third type of equilibrium. As discussed in Section IV, it is one in which policy makers, while unable to control migration directly, are able to force a wedge between the expected utility of urban residents and the utility of rural residents by inducing urban unemployment. There is then a trade-off between unemployment (wasted resources) and sectoral inequality (desired given the differential costs of consumption). We discuss when a government can raise social welfare by intervening in a competitive economy to create unemployment. These conditions depend crucially on the proportion of urban jobs that are potentially available to migrants (non-patronage jobs). Consider the extreme case in which there are no non-patronage jobs; rural residents have no incentive to migrate to the city, and with appropriate government intervention, the first best can be achieved. At the other extreme, rural residents have the same access to urban jobs as urban residents. In this case, urban unemployment idles labour without generating any socially desirable inequality, and the government must be resigned to the equal-utilities allocation. In intermediate cases it may be worth creating some unemployment to generate some inequality. We term the resulting equilibrium a second-best, unemployment equilibrium. The example beginning in footnote 3 on page 4I 7 makes some of these points in an explicit and consistent manner under rather stark assumptions.
The final section of the paper discusses the shadow wage implications of the model of differential costs. We show that the shadow wage depends on whether individuals hired for government projects are ensured an urban sector job or are from the group facing possible unemployment in their search for urban employment.
I. THE GENERAL MODEL
There is a fixed number of ex ante identical individuals in the closed economy. An individual may work either in the manufacturing (M) sector located in the urban area, or in the agricultural (A) sector, or be unemployed (u). Individuals must reside and consume in the sector where they work or are unemployed -a critical indivisibility or non-convexity. Tastes are described by the strictly concave utility function U(a, m), where a is consumption of the agricultural good, and m consumption of the manufactured good, including public services. It is the m-good that is relatively more expensive to provide in the rural areas. The social valuation of utility is given by the concave function, S(U).
The policy-maker's objective is to maximise social welfare, quantities they consume. The unemployed are not distinguished by sector, since the model is such that only urban unemployment occurs, as will soon be evident. The production of both outputs uses only labour. Each worker has a constant marginal product of a in agriculture and I in manufacturing. These assumptions are made for analytical convenience because the consideration of factor-income distribution when fixed factors other than labour exist raises thorny questions about the distribution of factor ownership and the taxation of factor rents. We hope to relax this assumption in future research but believe that valuable insight can be gained most easily in this simplified framework.
Agricultural goods are privately consumed and costless to transport, and therefore aCLA-a,A L.A -amLM-auLu = o.
The output of the manufacturing sector is used either in the city or in the countryside: 
Finally, we develop a migration equilibrium condition which is applicable when there is free migration, but not otherwise. We assume that a rural migrant does not have access to all jobs in the urban area. The parameter, 1f, denotes the fraction of all manufacturing jobs that a migrant has a chance of obtaining.
This parameter has at least two interpretations. First, (i -f) may be conceptualised as the fraction of urban sector jobs that is available through patronage or connections, which incorporates the fact that urban-born city dwellers may be more efficient in search than migrants. Alternatively, (i -fi) may represent a policy parameter with the government able to ensure that (i -I) of the urban jobs go to city-dwellers, but unable to assign the remainder. The extent of, and rules applicable to, government employment are an important determinant of fi, but at this stage we do not attempt to model the micro-foundations of ft.
We refer to , as the proportion of non-patronage jobs.
1 There are alternative formulations to this. The additional costs of consuming the m-good in the rural sector may involve an implicit sacrifice of the a-good rather than the m-good. For instance, travel to the city for medical care or education involves time away from agricultural production. Or, the good that costs more in the rural sector may also have to be produced there, often because it is a service. In this case there are two additional costs in the countryside: that incurred because producers of the agricultural good consume at higher cost and that incurred because producers of the good with differential costs are themselves located in the rural sector where they too consume some of the differential-cost good. In this specification there needs to be some other good that the urban sector can exchange for the a-good, if the equilibrium without government intervention is to have any urban sector when the a-good is necessary to survival. Otherwise, these two alternative formulations seem to lead to largely similar qualitative conclusions to the one we investigate in the paper. Finally, it should be noted that some goods may be cheaper to consume in the countryside, offsetting the effects we discuss. If this type of good predominates, which we doubt, our conclusions would be reversed, with the rural sector having the role of the urban and vice versa. Despite the ex ante equality of individuals in the two sectors, the first-best optimum involves inequality.2 In the 'normal' case, which we assume in the rest of the paper, urban dwellers are better off than rural dwellers. The fact that individuals must be located entirely in one sector or the other for purposes of both production and consumption is the source of the non-convexity in the model leading to this result. Agriculturalists are inefficient consumers from a Benthamite perspective. Urban bias is then the natural outcome of technological conditions that yield a 0 > I. 3 If policy is restricted to taxes/subsidies on input and output prices, the firstbest cannot be attained. With free migration, nothing prevents agriculturalists from migrating until (7) is satisfied, which is inconsistent with the first-best allocation.
1 Consumption levels of each good by the three types of individuals must be non-negative or meet some other imposed subsistence thresholds. Without these constraints, the solution to the maximisation can lead to unbounded consumption quantities -for instance, where both the utility and social welfare functions are homogeneous of degree one and the migration constraint does not apply.
2 So long as some of each good is produced and the manufacturing good has a non-zero income elasticity.
s The unequal treatment of equals can be presented even more starkly by the following example. Assume each individual must consume a+ of the agricultural good to survive, but never desires to consume more. Further let 0 = oo so that rural residents cannot consume any of the manufactured good (Um(a, o) is assumed finite). Then labour allocation in the first best will be aLLA = (LM+LLA) a+ = a+. Each agriculturalist will receive U(a+, o) while each urban resident will receive U(a+, i), i.e. utility from the whole of his product plus a subsidy of a+. Clearly every agriculturalist would wish to become an urban resident. There is, however, no escape from the inequality in this economy. Even a Rawlsian would have to accept that the lot of the worst-off members cannot be improved. We continue this example in footnotes I on page 4I8 and I on page 419. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EQUAL-UTILITIES ALLOCATION
When there are no patronage jobs so that ft = I, we have We now turn to the role that unemployment can play as a partial tax on migration, allowing the planner to achieve an allocation that may be superior to the equal-utilities allocation.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT ALLOCATION
By lowering the probability that a migrant will obtain an urban job, urban unemployment discourages migration. Unemployment therefore acts as a tax or partial restriction on migration. We have already shown that a prohibitive tax or full restriction on migration can be used in decentralising the first-best allocation. Thus intuition suggests that the deliberate creation of unemployment in an otherwise laissez-faire competitive economy, might be welfare-improving in some circumstances. Such a strategy would not permit attainment of the firstbest allocation, however, since there is no unemployment in the first best. We now discuss when an allocation characterised by positive unemployment dominates the laissez-faire, zero-unemployment equilibrium of Section III, and when it does what determines the (second-best) optimal amount of unemployment. As noted earlier, unemployment can be generated in our economy by the creation of manufacturing jobs that provide a higher level of utility than agricultural jobs. If all urban jobs are non-patronage jobs, however, all individuals would have the same expected utility. Creating unemployment would have no beneficial effects, since it would not be successful in diverting goods from the rural resident to the average urban resident (with utility of UA when , = I). With patronage jobs, however, the creation of unemployment may generate desired inequality. Goods are effectively redistributed from everyone else to those residents in the city with patronage jobs (who are efficient pleasure machines). ' We first examine sufficient conditions for an allocation with positive urban unemployment to dominate the (zero-unemployment) equal-utilities allocation (ELUA). We then analyse a special case based on a Cobb-Douglas utility function for which we can derive necessary and sufficient conditions as well as some other characteristics of the EUA.
The general sufficient condition for there to be an allocation with positive unemployment that dominates the EUA is that a-/TaL > o, evaluated at the EUA or equivalently that Thus, unemployment is more likely to be desirable, the higher is 6 (the greater the cost differential between town and country), the higher is p (the higher the marginal propensity to consume m), the lower is , (the higher the percentage of patronage jobs), and the lower is LA,I/LA (the lower the proportion of workers in manufacturing). The higher is 0, the greater the inequality that can be generated from a given loss of output. If the unemployed cannot be excluded from consumption of some of the m-good, say because it involves urban amenities available to everyone, then the condition for urban unemployment is less likely to be met. (In Proposition 4. I the last step would not be valid, since mu > o would be a constraint.) We now turn to the non-Benthamite (S" < o) cases. The central theme that we have stressed is the dilemma for policy-makers caused by the relatively high cost of providing certain goods and services to residents of rural areas. This one asymmetry between the two sectors results in a social incentive to discriminate against rural residents. Since rural residents will try to leave the sector to avoid this discrimination, the first best cannot be attained unless migration can be restricted. The creation of urban unemployment can, under certain circumstances, provide a means of discouraging migration. Consequently there may be a positive optimal unemployment rate. Because unemployment derives from the desire of migrants to obtain an urban job, it is important in the shadow costing of labour in government projects to know whether migrants view employment with the project as possible or not. Depending on migrants' access to project employment, the shadow wage can either exceed or fall below the value of the marginal product of urban sector employees or the income of employed individuals in the urban sector. These results contrast sharply with assertions made by others that the shadow wage should be equal to zero (because there is unemployment), the expected wage in the urban sector (and therefore always less than income of employed urban residents) or the wage of the urban employed.
The theoretical framework suggests some priorities for empirical research. As already noted, there is little knowledge about relative costs of providing different goods and services to the two sectors. There is also very little information on the importance to the migration decision of access to goods and services at relatively low prices. Some public goods may be virtually unavailable in the countryside. Effects should be made to document how migrants obtain jobs and the advantages held by urban-born job seekers.
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